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The recent global financial crisis has intensified debate over the proper roles of government and 
market in governing the economy. Although there is a consensus on the immediate causes that triggered 
the crisis, scholars and commentators have been sharply divided in their assessments of its root causes. 
Some view the crisis as clear evidence of market failures (Stiglitz 2011; Lounsbury 2010), others attribute 
the root causes of the problem to counterproductive government interventions, or to government failures 
(Taylor 2009).   
These divergent opinions are in part fueled by a failure to reconcile some critical differences 
among a few of the major theories that guide policy decisions. For example, whereas applications of the 
theory of market failures point to the need to expand the scope of government interventions to correct 
market failures, insights from public choice theory suggest that government interventions often fail to 
achieve their objectives, due to principal–agent problems and self-interest among politicians and 
government officials (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000; Datta-Chaudhuri 1990; Krueger 1991; Zerbe and 
McCurdy 1999).  Some scholars argue that it might be better to leave the market alone, despite clear 
evidence of market failures due to government failures in cases where government interventions would 
worsen the situation (Friedman 2009; Becker and Murphy 2009). But recurring disastrous outcomes such 
as the recent financial and economic crises suggest that the consequences of ignoring market failures can 
be just as deadly.  
We address recent discussions on the proper roles for government and market by presenting a 
conceptual framework that features the duality between market imperfections and government 
imperfections.  From this standpoint it can be argued that the potential of government interventions or 
market mechanisms as main policy instruments can be eroded by some fundamental deficiencies deeply 
rooted in either government or market as a social institution and, further, that the impacts of such 
deficiencies may be much more extensive than postulated by existing theories.   
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We apply this framework to policy development in two policy sectors in Singapore, land transport 
and health care, in order to explore the proper role of market and government in the present context. 
These two sectors were chosen because traffic congestion and escalation of health care expenditures are 
among the major policy challenges confronting most if not all countries in the world today. The creative 
ways in which the island republic has dealt with these problems, using market-centered efforts to offset 
and complement government-centered measures, and vice versa, offer instructive insights into the use of 
policy innovations combining government interventions and market mechanisms.  
Our analysis suggests how policy mixes might become the norm of response to addressing policy 
problems found in a range of sectors. Because of the duality between market and government 
imperfections, effective solutions to policy problems may lie in the use of a mixture of policy instruments 
that not only can address market and government imperfections simultaneously, but also can likewise take 
the advantage of the strengths of both market and government. The framework presented here is designed 
to distinguish among different policy mixes according to their policy effectiveness and also to provide 
some useful guiding principles for policy design.  
The Duality of Market Imperfections and Government Imperfections 
The theory of market failures has occupied a central place in the study of public policy for several 
decades (Weimer and Vining 2005). The theory postulates that the pursuit of private interests leads to 
inefficient outcomes under circumstances such as the provision of public goods, natural monopoly, 
externalities, and information asymmetry, and that government interventions can be used to correct these 
problems. The theory of market failures is used widely not only as a diagnostic tool for analyzing policy 
problems but also as an analytical tool for making policy choices (Kleiman and Teles 2008).  
The dominance of the theory of market failures in guiding policy decisions has been challenged by 
scholars from various intellectual traditions. Some argue that the efficacy of governments in solving 
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problems associated with market failures cannot be taken for granted because of principal–agent problems 
in public affairs (Mueller 1976; Osborne 1993); others point to the exclusive focus on economic 
efficiency as a major limitation of the theory of market failures, as this obscures other equally important 
goals, such as distributional equity and social justice, that are pursued by governments (Wolf 1987; Grand 
1991). There are also other circumstances in which markets fail to produce optimal outcomes because of 
the illusive nature of a competitive market (Weimer and Vining 2005).  
Criticisms of the theory of market failures have led the development of a public sector analogy of 
“government failures”: government interventions may result in inefficient outcomes due to principal–
agent problems and lack of competition in the public sector (Wolf 1987; Le Grand 1991; Vining and 
Weimer 1990). Compared to the theory of market failures, however, the concept of government failures 
has not been extensively tested, and thus its applications in policy analysis have been rather limited. One 
major shortcoming of a theory of government failures as a diagnostic tool in policy analysis is the absence 
of a clearly defined norm that would serve as a basis for determining the nature and extent of such 
failures. Another shortcoming is that the concept of government failures, like the theory of market 
failures, is focused exclusively on a criterion of efficiency.   
In response to the evolving discussion to date on market failures and government failures, the 
alternative framework presented here focuses on the duality, or reciprocal aspects, of market and 
government imperfections (see Figure 1). Market imperfections here refer to a set of inherent deficiencies 
of market, as a social institution, in solving policy problems. The first of these deficiencies or 
imperfections is that the use of market mechanisms will cause a loss of economic efficiency when 
conditions for market failures, such public goods externalities, natural monopoly, and information 
asymmetry, are present.  Second, markets on their own cannot be relied on in pursuing policy goals other 
than economic efficiency, such as equity, social justice, and security. Third, the presence of market power 
is more widespread than can be accounted for in the narrow circumstances defined by market failures, 
because a “perfectly competitive market” is often illusive in practice. Fourth, although the transaction 
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costs involved in enabling exchange between buyers and sellers can be prohibitively high, these are often 
neglected when market mechanisms are considered (Zerbe and McCurdy 1999). Fifth, the use of market 
mechanisms in the financing and provision of essential public services, such as water, social security, and 
health care, may be met with strong public opposition that will undermine their effectiveness. Sixth, 
although rationality is the cornerstone of any market mechanism aimed at achieving efficient outcomes, 
the actual experience of market participants may confront the policy maker or decision maker with a 
variety of limitations that can severely undermine the potential of market mechanisms.  
<Figure 1 about here> 
Government imperfections, on the other hand, refers to a set of inherent deficiencies deeply 
rooted in government itself as another social institution engaged in approaching policy problems. First, 
the effectiveness of government interventions depends critically on the ability of governments to access 
the information necessary for policy decisions, but that capability cannot be taken for granted even for 
governments with sufficient resources to do so (Kleiman and Teles 2008). Second, principal–agent 
tensions are pervasive in government, because of the challenges of measuring and monitoring 
performance in the public sector (Wolf 1987); this raises concerns regarding poor performance and rent 
seeking (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000; Krueger 1991). Third, as with market power, the pressures from 
organized interests or special interest groups may undermine the effectiveness of government 
interventions. Fourth, similar to the problem of neglect of transaction costs in the case of market 
mechanisms, administrative costs in government interventions can be substantial but are often disregarded 
(Krueger 1991), Fifth, because many forms of government intervention are based on monopolistic 
arrangements, their effectiveness may be undermined due to a lack of competition. Sixth, although 
effective government interventions depend on the voluntary cooperation by the general public, 
expectations of willing public cooperation can be a source of weaknesses (Kleiman and Teles 2008), and 
government interventions may inadvertently elicit strategic counter-responses from those affected. 
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Seventh, many forms of government intervention—such as subsidies, grants, or public provisions—
require budget outlay from the government, but their financial sustainability cannot be taken for granted.  
The categorization of market and government imperfections shown in Figure 1 provides insights 
into some sources of tension over the proper roles of government and market in solving policy problems. 
Inherent deficiencies of both market mechanisms and government interventions give rise to what might be 
called the duality problem. On the one hand, market imperfections require the use of government 
interventions such as regulation, direct provision, and taxation, but the effectiveness of these interventions 
may be undermined by attendant government imperfections. On the other hand, while government 
imperfections give rise to the need to adopt market mechanisms (Wallis and Dollery 2002), such as 
privatization, user charges, and deregulation, as remedies, such mechanisms are in turn subject to market 
imperfections. 
The framework of the duality of market imperfections and government imperfections as 
schematized in Figure 1 differs from the existing literature on market failures and government failures in 
several important aspects. First, the framework looks beyond efficiency as the criterion for assessing 
policy effectiveness. For instance, although it includes loss of efficiency associated with classic market 
failures as among the inherent deficiencies of markets, the framework also considers areas where the main 
concern is not economic efficiency. Second, although the framework construes market and government 
imperfections as inevitable threats or risks associated with different policy responses, it also uses these 
failures to identify shortcomings to be avoided through policy responses. Third, the framework provides a 
systematic way to compare both market and government as alternative social institutions for solving 
policy problems.  
This suggested duality between market and government imperfections offers justification for more 
extensive use of policy mixes, as any single policy instrument aimed at addressing either market or 
government imperfections will inadvertently and inevitably induce the effects and the imperfections of 
the other. For example, the presence of natural monopoly (resulting from market imperfections) 
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necessitates regulation, which is potentially subject to several government imperfections, such as 
information asymmetry and rent-seeking behavior on the part of producers. The inherent government 
imperfections, in turn, call for use of measures such as competitive bidding and yardstick competition to 
offset the government’s shortcomings. Policy mixes consisting of regulation, competiveness bidding, and 
yardstick competition are thus necessary to correct the duality problem in monopoly sectors. 
In addition to addressing concerns over the duality between market and government imperfections, 
the design of policy mixes may also include consideration of how to take advantage of the strengths of 
both market and government. The strengths of the market may include (1) efficiency gains from 
competition, (2) freedom of choices for consumers, (3) faster responses to changing circumstances, and 
(4) financial sustainability in service provision. Strengths of the government include (1) economy of scale 
at the societal level, (2) pursuit of goals other than economic efficiency, (3) quick and sure change due to 
the use of coercive power, (4) the ability to alter incentive structures, and (5) accountability to a public 
majority in some cases.  
These strengths of market and government mechanisms provide another compelling reason for the 
use of multiple policy instruments, that is, policy mixes, as a policy response to the duality between 
market and government imperfections. Policy instruments based on the strengths of the market can be 
combined with those based on the strengths of the government to benefit from both while also minimizing 
their respective disadvantages. Because market mechanisms are employed to deal with government 
failures, and government intervention is used to reduce the impacts of the market failures, it is possible 
simultaneously to take advantage of both (Figure 2).  
<Figure 2 about here> 
The framework presented in Figure 1 also suggests some useful guidelines for policy design, as 
multiple policy instruments may be available for addressing the same policy problem, thus offering 
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components to create a standard for comparison. Different policy instruments may perform differently, 
ceteris paribus, when combined differently. Some instruments, for example, perform well in tackling 
market imperfections but are prone to government imperfections; other instruments may be moderately 
effective in tackling market imperfections but are subject to less severe government imperfections. 
Criteria for comparing different policy instruments as well as policy mixes could include (1) addressing 
market imperfections, (2) addressing government imperfections, (3) taking advantage of market strengths, 
and (4) taking advantage of government strengths. 
Innovative Policy Mixes in Singapore 
 Singapore is well known for its enthusiastic adoption of measures in land transport and health care 
that have been subsequently emulated elsewhere. For instance, Singapore was the first country in the 
world to adopt congestion charges to remedy traffic problems, and to institute medical savings accounts, 
which are now being considered in many countries. What is less well known is that these achievements 
are based not on the use of single policy instruments but on how core policy designs are combined with 
other, complementary instruments.  
Land Transport 
Traffic congestion is a way of life in many cities around the world despite the significant costs in 
terms of time, energy, and pollution that it imposes on governments, businesses, and individuals. Recent 
estimates set traffic congestion costs in the United States at US$78 billion annually, and congestion 
accounts for as much as 1 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom (Tan 2009). Yet governments find it 
difficult to address traffic congestion because it is in many ways a classic wicked problem. Many cities 
have implemented infrastructural projects such as road-widening and additional expressways, only to find 
that such solutions may ease congestion in the short run but aggravate the problem over time, as more 
cars are bought and driven and are attracted to the improved road network. Singapore’s experience in 
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tackling traffic congestion offers an opportunity to examine the relevance of the duality between market 
and government imperfections in addressing the problem.  
Traffic congestion is often included in economics textbooks as an example of externalities whereby 
road users disregard the negative impacts of their actions on others. The recommended corrective for the 
negative externality is regulation and taxation of car ownership and usage. The effectiveness of these 
government interventions may be undermined by government imperfections, according to the duality 
between market and government imperfections.   
Due to rising household income and unreliable public transport, the private vehicle population in 
Singapore roughly doubled from 70,100 to 142,500 between 1960 and 1970 (Santos, Li, and Koh 2004). 
The government introduced an Additional Registration Fee (ADF), a percentage (15%) of the Open 
Market Value (OMV) of vehicles, in 1968 as an surcharge aimed at bringing down the rate of increase in 
vehicle population, which can be interpreted as the use of government intervention to correct a market 
failure, an externality. However, the ADF’s effectiveness was undermined by several government 
imperfections, such as inadequate access to information needed to determine the right amount of 
additional charge and to gauge strategic responses. In response to pressures in demand for car ownership, 
the government aggressively increased the ADF to 25% in 1972, 55% in 1974, 100% in 1975, 150% in 
1980, and 175% in 1983, but it rapidly became clear that the effects of this strategy for curbing growth of 
the number of private cars on the road were quite limited, although it would be politically unwise to 
continuing increasing ADF in such a manner. No less significantly, as ADF applied only to new cars, the 
policy discouraged existing vehicle owners from replacing their cars and encouraged prospective 
purchasers to buy used cars only, thus contributing to air pollution from a growing population of older, 
less fuel-efficient vehicles (Santos, Li, and Koh 2004)  
 In addition to ADF, the government introduced the Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) in 1975 to 
control the usage of vehicles. Under ALS, an individual vehicle owner must purchase a permit to drive 
 11 
 
into any designated “restricted zone” during peak hours. Although the scheme was quite effective initially 
due to the relatively high level of the fee for permits (Seik 1998), the government found it difficult to 
expand deployment of ALS due to high costs of enforcement and the development of strategic behavior 
among car owners—an instance of government imperfection.  
In 1990 the government decided to add a further, extreme measure, the Vehicle Quota System 
(VQS), into the policy mix, in part due to the failure of existing policy instruments to reduce traffic 
congestion and in part due to the limited parking provisions in Housing Development Board (HDB) 
estates. Under VQS, prospective vehicle owners are required to purchase a ten-year license called a 
Certificate of Entitlement (COE), and the number of COEs available for purchase is determined by the 
government on the basis of prevailing traffic conditions and road capacity, thus placing the total number 
of vehicles in the county under the direct control of the government. The effectiveness of this policy 
derives from the strengths of government, as it would have been impossible for market mechanisms to 
guarantee such a definite outcome. Still in place today, VQS is the single most important factor 
contributing to low car ownership in Singapore.  As a result of the mix of  related policy measures in 
place, the car ownership rate in Singapore is the lowest among high-income countries worldwide: 101 
cars per 1,000 persons, compared to 441 in Japan and 461 in the United States in 2010 (Table 1).  
<Table 1 about here> 
While the ceiling set on the number of cars sold in a given time period is effective in dealing with 
the externality problem, the allocation of COEs entails significant risks due to the potential for 
government failures. The scarcity of COEs offers rent-seeking opportunities for organized interests, even 
corruption. The Singapore government has dealt with these concerns through the use of a competitive 
bidding system whereby potential buyers must bid for a COE in public tender (Lam and Toan 2006). The 
use of this market mechanism (auction) not only protects the system against government imperfections 
but also takes advantage of the strengths of the market by allowing the COE premium to be more 
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responsive to fluctuations in demand and supply. Figure 3 shows fluctuations in the COE premium over 
the course of a single year.  
<Figure 3 About Here> 
Advances in information technology revitalized policy instruments aimed at controlling the usage 
of vehicles in Singapore. In 1997 the government introduced Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) to replace the 
permit-based systems such as ALS. Under ERP, a unit detectable by sensors stationed on gantries over 
roads and expressways is installed in all vehicles, and these sensors deduct charges automatically from the 
driver’s cash card (inserted into the unit) as the vehicle passes beneath the gantries. There were about 70 
gantries in the country in 2012. ERP charges are set to encourage the optimal level of road speeds. It was 
decided that to optimize road usage, speed limits should be set at 20 km/hour to 30 km/hour on a basket 
of Central Business District (CBD) roads and at 45 km/hour to 65 km/hour on expressways.  
ERP charges vary by location of gantry as well as by time, based on traffic volume: when speed 
exceeds the upper threshold, ERP charges should be reduced to allow more vehicles to use the roads; 
when the speed falls below the lower threshold, a sign of traffic congestion, the charge should be 
increased. Statistics show that the ERP is quite effective in controlling traffic volume: in 2011 the average 
speed during the peak hours was 62.5 km/hour for expressways and 28.5 km/hour for arterial roads  
(LTA, 2012). More important, the combination of VQS and ERP enables the government to balance 
between vehicle ownership costs and usage charges to minimize the costs of these measures on car 
owners.  
A major criticism of the use of a market mechanism (competitive bidding) in allocating COEs is 
concern over distributional equity, one of the market imperfections, as low-income households are bid out 
of the market for vehicles altogether (Santos, Li, and Koh 2004). The rapid development of public 
transport is a part of the government’s strategies to address such concerns. High standards are specified to 
guide route design, scheduling, and safety for public transport. For example, government guidelines state 
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that “HDB towns must have MRT and/or bus services that directly connect with city center”;  “peak hour 
passenger load must not exceed100% of the bus’s designated capacity”; and “route must be direct, not 
more than 30% longer than comparable trips by car.”  
Using a mix of policy instruments in controlling car ownership and usage thus has also provided 
ridership and political support for the development of public transit. The promotion of public transport 
has been pursued internationally in almost all cities suffering from traffic congestion, but such measures 
are rarely effective because individual car ownership and usage are allowed to remain attractive options. 
Without active policy measures aimed at controlling car ownership and usage, it is a wishful thinking to 
believe that the development of public transit will provide sufficient incentives for car users to switch to 
public transport.  
Table  2 summarizes the policy mixes used to tackle traffic congestion problems in Singapore, in 
the framework of the duality between market and government imperfections.  
<Table 2 about here> 
Health Care 
Health care is regarded as one of the most challenging of all policy problems because there is no 
known way of responding adequately to all contending pressures. Efforts to curtail unnecessary demand 
have the inadvertent effect of making health care inaccessible, especially to those who need it the most 
and can afford it the least. Similarly, efforts to assist users have the inadvertent effect of disadvantaging 
providers. Measures that improve service quality through competition among providers and/or insurers 
inexorably raise total expenditures and worsen access for those who cannot afford services. Government 
provision of health care is handicapped by bureaucratic pathology of unresponsiveness and inefficiencies. 
Government financing can maintain access, but in the long run the government will pose fiscal difficulties 
unless it imposes controls over both providers and users. However, such a high level of intervention is 
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fraught with the risk of falling prey to government imperfections that will worsen the conditions for all 
stakeholders. 
Singapore fares well among countries that have tried to contain total health expenditures while still 
maintaining reasonable access, a conclusion borne out by international comparison of health systems 
(WHO, 2000). The effects of Singapore’s reforms are evident in their outcomes, which are excellent on 
most dimensions. Its infant mortality rate (2 per 1,000) is one of the lowest in the world. and average life 
expectancy (82 years) is one of the highest (see Table 3). This has been achieved at a relatively small 
cost: total health expenditures formed only 3.3 percent of the GDP in 2008, less than one-half of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average. Even when adjusted to 
account for a relatively high per capita income, Singapore’s expenditures on health care are only half of 
what would be predicted for a country at its income level (Wagstaff, 2005: 4).  The government achieved 
the outcome through a creative policy mix of government intervention and market mechanisms. 
<Table 3 about here> 
At the time Singapore attained independence in the mid-1960s, its health care system was 
dominated by the public sector in hospital care and by the private sector in outpatient care; that legacy 
continues to the present. The cost implications of the government’s shouldering the bulk of hospital care 
costs became evident in the early 1980s, following a rise in the incidence of debilitating diseases and a 
growing realization that the country’s population was aging. Reforms initiated at that time have been 
continued zealously over the three decades since (Ramesh 2008).  
Concerted reform of public hospitals in Singapore began with the launch of the National Health 
Plan in 1983. The plan’s analysis of the sector’s problems centered on government failures characteristic 
of public health care systems: inefficiency, unresponsiveness, and rising expenditures due to lack of 
market competition (Hsiao 1995). The plan’s designers argued that government financing and inflexible 
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government controls, along with lack of competition among hospitals, had promoted complacency, 
unresponsiveness, and overall inefficiency.  
To put the plan into effect, the government started with a gradual but steady increase in user 
charges in public hospitals, so as to recover a greater portion of operating expenses. This and other 
measures were designed to confront the perceived limitations of publicly provided and publicly financed 
health care. However, such measures necessitated financing reforms in order to help households pay for 
the increased user charges that were introduced in the following years. 
The financing reforms started with the launch of a compulsory savings program called Medisave in 
1984. The program compels every employed person to set aside 7 percent to 9.5 percent (depending on 
age group) of monthly income into a personal Medisave account. Funds in the personal account may be 
withdrawn to meet costs of hospitalization, day surgery, and certain outpatient procedures for the 
individual or a family member. Medisave is intended to address the problem of moral hazard among users 
and reduce the government’s fiscal burden.  
In 1990, following the realization that a vast majority of the population did not have sufficient 
funds in their Medisave accounts to pay for treatment of illnesses involving high costs, the government 
launched MediShield. It is a catastrophic illness insurance scheme with a large number of exclusions and 
a high co-payment and deductible to keep premiums affordable. MediShield is intended to curb the moral 
hazards of insurance while still providing financing for those suffering from illnesses with high treatment 
costs. The government also created a small public assistance scheme called Medifund, established in 
April 1993, for persons unable to afford care due to lack of personal or Medisave savings. Even so, 
Medisave, MediShield, and Medifund together form less than 10 percent of the country’s total health care 
expenditures. Direct funding from the government budget remains the largest source of health care 
financing after out-of-pocket payments. The government distributes these subsidies largely through 
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transfers to hospitals to compensate for the losses they incur in operating Class B and C wards, which 
recover only between 20 percent and 80 percent of their costs from users.  
 The reform of public hospitals to reduce their government-centered deficiencies has been a more 
complex and protracted process. In 1985, the government established a nonprofit holding company, 
Health Corporation of Singapore Private Limited (HCS), for the purpose of owning public hospitals and 
overseeing their operation. HCS was registered as a private company, with the government as the 
complete owner. In turn, HCS owned individual public hospitals that were also registered as separate 
private companies with broad operational autonomy. Over the next fifteen years all public hospitals were 
gradually corporatized and put under HCS ownership. Each corporatized hospital was fully autonomous 
with power to recruit staff, set rates of remuneration, and decide on deployment of resources. Each 
hospital’s management was accountable to its board of directors and was required to follow commercial 
accounting principles and procedures. This unusual arrangement was intended to allow broad autonomy 
to hospital managers (to minimize the effects of government imperfections) while maintaining the 
government’s ownership rights (to minimize the effects of market imperfections).  
The tricky part of the reforms centered on promoting competition among hospitals without 
impairing access for those unable to pay. The government promoted competition by encouraging hospitals 
to attract unsubsidized A and B1 ward patients, because the surplus (revenues minus costs) generated 
from such patients could be retained. For the B2 and C ward patients, the government only pays for the 
gap between what patients were billed and what they actually paid. The objective of these unusual 
financing arrangements was to promote competition for full-fee-paying patients without undermining the 
incentive to treat subsidized patients. This strategy did not turn out as expected, as hospitals soon 
concentrated on for full-fee paying patients, and did not seek subsidized patients. To attract, full-fee-
paying patients, hospitals purchased the latest equipment and technology and recruited highly regarded 
physicians by offering them higher salaries. These developments had the effect of raising prices at an 
even faster rate than had been the case before the reforms.  
 17 
 
By the beginning of the 1990s broad recognition that the reforms were worsening the situation led 
to the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Health Policy. The resulting white paper, published 
under the title Affordable Healthcare (Singapore 1993) bluntly noted: “Market forces alone will not 
suffice to hold down medical costs to the minimum.” It went on to say: “In healthcare, supply tends to 
create its own demand, thus raising healthcare expenditure. The Government therefore needs to intervene 
to prevent an oversupply of services, to dampen unnecessary demand and ultimately, to control costs”.  
This publication marked the beginning of the second phase of reform. Its conclusion that “We need 
additional controls to keep hospitals efficient and to prevent cost inflation” (p. 35) accurately sums up the 
direction these reforms took during the 1990s. First, to encourage public hospitals to concentrate on 
providing inpatient care to middle- and lower-income groups, the government limited the proportion of 
beds in A class wards in each hospital to 13 percent of total capacity. Second, to further reduce the 
corporatized hospitals’ revenue-maximizing tendencies, the Ministry of Health (MOH) imposed revenue 
caps in the form of set average cost per patient day for specific services. Third, to incentivize provision of 
services to subsidized patients, the government introduced a funding formula based on units of service 
actually provided instead of issuing block grants. Fourth, corporatized hospitals were required to seek 
MOH approval before acquisition of expensive technology and introduction of new clinical specialties. 
Fifth, while setting medical fees remained in the purview of the individual hospitals, MOH approval was 
required for large increases (Hanvoravongchai 2002).  
The third phase of reforms began in the late 1990s as the government sought to consolidate and 
build upon its past reforms and to establish institutions and processes that promoted desired behavior on 
the part of hospital managers without detailed government intervention. The first measure in this direction 
was the decision in 1999 to cluster public hospitals into two groups. The intense competition among 
individual hospitals was now viewed as hindering planning and optimal deployment of resources. The 
large disparities in the size and reputation of different hospitals also made competition difficult for the 
smaller and more modestly equipped hospitals. To counter these obstacles the government announced the 
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creation of two similarly sized “clusters” of public hospitals and clinics to replace HCS: the National 
Healthcare Group (NHG) and the Singapore Health Group (SingHealth). This reorganization—along the 
lines of government intervention to correct market imperfections—was intended to promote economies of 
scale, effective coordination and planning of resources, better integration of inpatient and outpatient 
facilities, and a more effective patient referral system within each cluster. 
NHG and SingHealth, still in existence today, are separate private companies owned entirely by 
Ministry of Health Holdings Private Limited, a holding company owned by the government. Similarly, 
each public hospital is a separate private company owned entirely by either NHG or SingHealth. 
Notwithstanding government ownership, NHG and SingHealth and their subsidiary hospitals are separate 
firms subject to the same company laws that apply to private firms. Legally, they enjoy operational 
autonomy in all areas, including recruitment, remuneration, purchase, and pricing of services. They also 
have substantial revenues and surplus from treating patients in nonsubsidized wards, which reinforces 
their autonomy. Yet the fact that the government remains the owner means that it can control and direct 
the hospitals, if necessary, in ways that would not be possible if they were truly private firms.  
Another measure to improve service quality and to lower prices has been to increase the amount of 
information on hospital charges and clinical outcomes made available to customers. Since 2003, public 
hospitals have each been required to publish average bill size for various common conditions and 
procedures; the collated data is subsequently published on the MOH web page 
(http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/charges/common/procedures.do). There is evidence that the publication of 
such data has imposed downward pressure on prices (Wong, Wu, and Wong 2007). 
By the mid-1990s public hospitals had begun to operate largely in ways the government policies 
intended: fee increases became less frequent, proliferation of new specialties slowed down, and the 
number of subsidized beds expanded. Correspondingly, government subsidies as a share of total health 
care expenditures, which had declined rapidly in the late 1980s and reached 18 percent of the total by 
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1992, began to creep up again and stabilized at 25 percent by mid-decade (Massaro and Wong, 1995). 
The economic recession that began in late 1997 increased the demand for lower-class hospital wards and, 
hence, the amount the government spent on health care subsidies. 
Table 4 summarizes the policy mixes used to address health care challenges in Singapore, within 
the framework of the duality between market and government imperfections.  
<Table 4 about here> 
Discussion 
The case studies described above provide evidence demonstrating the duality between market 
imperfections and government imperfections. In land transport, additional charges introduced by the 
government of Singapore in dealing with externalities were severely undermined by government 
imperfections such as information gap and strategic response, and the use of market mechanisms such as 
auction for COEs gave rise to concerns over equity, a typical market imperfection. In health care, 
corporatization of publicly owned hospitals as a solution to government imperfections subjected the 
system to a set of market imperfections due to ubiquity of market failures in health care, and the 
government subsidies of public hospitals raised concerns of inefficiency, a characteristic of health 
facilities in the public sector. These inherent deficiencies of both market and government are commonly 
seen in other countries and other sectors.  
The general success of innovative policy mixes introduced in the two sectors in Singapore to deal 
with both market imperfections and government imperfections simultaneously make these mixes 
distinctive. In land transport, competitive bidding has been used to not only address information deficit in 
government interventions, but also to take advantage of strengths of market mechanisms; at the same 
time, measures such as setting high standards for the public transport system have been put in place to 
address shortcomings inherent to the use of market mechanisms.  In health care, on the one hand, 
considerable government subsidies have been provided to government-owned hospitals to address market 
 20 
 
imperfections pervasive in the health sector, such as increasing user charges, and medical savings plans 
have been introduced to correct problems of government imperfections in health care.  
Singapore’s success in dealing with difficulties challenges in the two sectors, however, should not 
imply that Singapore has achieved “optimal policy mixes” in the two sectors, nor should it suggest that 
policy development in Singapore has been guided by the framework outlined above. In fact, the country’s 
search for the proper policy mixes has gone through various iterations and stages, with ups and downs in 
the process. Government increased charges for vehicle use four times, from 25 percent to 175 percent in 
ten years, before a policy change was made to confront shortcomings in traffic congestion policy more 
systematically. Similarly, policy mixes in Singapore’s health care system have also evolved through 
several phases. The first phase lasted from the mid-1980s to early 1990s and concentrated on 
corporatizing public hospitals (which accounted for more than four-fifths of total hospital care) and 
promoting competition among them. The second phase started in the early 1990s and was characterized 
by reassertion of government direction over hospitals’ operations, following the realization that 
competition had led to improvements in quality but also increased costs.  
This pragmatism in policy making in Singapore is perhaps among the most important factors 
accounting for its sustained search for effective policy mixes. A unique feature of the country’s political 
system is that a single party—People’s Action Party (PAP)—has won elections since 1959, when the 
country gained independence.  The resulting stability in political leadership implies that government can 
sustain its efforts in seeking innovative policy solutions over a long period of time. In comparison, 
incoming political leaders in many countries are often compelled to make drastic departures from the 
policy directions from their predecessors, a condition not conducive to consistent pursuit of effective 
policy mixes.      
Concluding Remarks 
Coase (1964, 195) has stated that “until we realize that we are choosing between social 
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arrangements that are more or less all failures, we are not likely to make much headway.” A framework 
illustrating duality between market and government imperfections has been presented here to promote 
better understanding of the inherent deficiencies of both market and government as sole authorities in 
policy design and analysis. By carefully counter-positioning the advantages offered by both sectors, 
policy mixes may overcome the limitations of both while accentuating their respective strengths. Markets 
and governments offer different opportunities and constraints to policy choice that are not always 
contradictory but, when used strategically, also can be complementary. The strengths of the two together 
are more than the sum of the parts.  
Analysis above has suggested how policy mixes might become the norm of response to address 
intractable problems found in a range of policy sectors. In the two cases studied here, Singapore’s 
successes in dealing with such problems resulted from combining seemingly unrelated or even 
contradictory market-based and government-based policy instruments in order to target the complex root 
causes of the problem. 
The mere presence of an assortment of different policy instruments drawing from both sectors does 
not necessarily lead to the policy success. In many countries, for example, use of a variety of policy 
instruments might reflect compromises among different stakeholders to advance their own interests, or 
represent difficulties in terminating policies instituted by prior governments when a new administration 
has come into power, with its own policy imperatives. In such circumstances, the policy mixes may 
become a source of tensions or conflicts that undermine policy effectiveness.  
The framework presented above not only can help policy makers to distinguish among different 
policy mixes in terms of effectiveness; it may also provide some useful guiding principles for policy 
design. First, due to duality between market and government imperfections, the adequacy of a policy mix 
depends on its effectiveness in addressing both kinds of imperfections simultaneously.  Second, the 
efficacy of a potential policy instrument under consideration should be assessed in the context of the 
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strengths and weaknesses of existing policy mixes that address market and government imperfections. 
Third, the concept of policy options can be broadened to compare not only different policy instruments, 
but also different combinations of policy instruments, that is, different policy mixes, as options in 
themselves. Last, optimal policy mixes may evolve over time as various factors underpinning their dual 
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Market imperfections  Government imperfections 
 Loss of economic efficiency due 
to classic market failures 
 Lack of mechanism to pursue 
goals other than efficiency  
 Market power  
 Transaction costs  
 Public distrust toward profit 
motive in essential services 
 Bounded rationality 
 
 Limited capability in accessing 
necessary information 
 Principal–agent problems 
 Power of organized interests 
 Administrative costs 
 Strategic responses  
 Lack of competition 
 Financial sustainability 
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Figure 3. Price of Certificate of Entitlement (COE) over the course of a single year (2008)  






Table 1. Car ownership in selected countries, 2011 
 
 GNI per capita,  
PPP (current International $) 
Passenger cars per 1,000 people 
Singapore 59,380 101 
South Korea 29,920 230 
Malaysia 15,560 225 
Japan 34,670 441 
United Kingdom 35,950 457 
United States 48,820 461 
 




Table 2. Singapore’s mix of policy instruments for confronting traffic congestion 
 Market Mechanisms  Government Interventions 
Policy instruments  Auction market to allocate    
     Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) 
Electronic Road Pricing (ERP)  
Additional registration fee 
Market or government  




Strength of  
market or government  
Sensitivity to changes in   
     demand and supply 











per capita  
income a 
Total expenditure  
on health care  
as % of GDP 
Infant 
mortality rate b 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth c 
 
1990 2000 2011 1995 2010 1990 2011 1990 2011 
China 800 2,340 8,390 3.5% 5.0% 39 13 68 76 
India 860 1,500 3,620 4.1% 3.7% 81 47 58 65 
Japan 18,820 25,690 34,670 6.8% 9.2% 5 2 79 83 
South Korea 7,690 15,444 29,920 3.7% 7.1% 6 4 72 81 
Singapore 17,410 32,350 59,380 3.6% 4.5% 6 2 75 82 
Canada 18,750 27,960 39,710 9.0% 11.4% 7 5 77 82 
United Kingdom 16,330 24,870 35,950 6.9% 9.6% 8 4 76 80 
United States 22,940 35,190 48,820 13.3% 17.6% 9 6 75 79 
a PPP in international $ 
 b Per 1,000 live births, both sexes 




Table 4. Singapore’s mix of policy instruments in health care 
 Market mechanisms  Government interventions 
Policy Instruments  Financing: 
    Out of pocket payment for  
          health care provision 
 
Registering public hospitals  
      as private firms 
Competition among providers,  
      public and private 
Provider payment 
Fee for service for outpatient services 
      and unsubsidized hospital wards 
Financing:  
    Medisave 
    MediShield 
    Medifund 
Transfers to hospitals  
Provision: 
    Public ownership of vast 
          majority of hospitals 
    Strict supervision of hospitals 
    Requirement to publicize 
          average price of treating  
          particular illnesses 
    Provider payment 
    Casemix and block grants for  
           subsidized hospital care 
Market or government 
imperfections 
requiring response 




Lack of concern for costs 
Fiscal unsustainability 
Information asymmetry 
Monopoly power of providers 
Lack of consumers’ ability  
    to assess service quality and  
    compare price 
Unaffordability for households 
Strengths  Sensitive to changes in demand  
    and supply 
Technical efficiency  
Flexibility 
Certainty  
Allocative efficiency 
 
 
